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ARTICLES

UNION ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF
LECHMERE, INC. v. NLRB
Robert A. Gorman*

In its recent decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,' the Supreme Court has addressed yet again an issue

that it first addressed some thirty-five years ago but that has become
increasingly important over the past decade -

the right of union

* Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I want to thank
Peter W. Hirsch, Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board in Philadelphia
(Region Four), for encouraging me to pay close attention to the issues discussed in this article;
and Professors Matthew W. Finkin of the University of Illinois College of Law and Michael
H. Gottesman of the Georgetown University Law Center for their very helpful comments on
an earlier draft. I also want to extend my deep gratitude to Felecia Listwa, University of
Pennsylvania Law School Class of 1992, for her indispensable assistance, in research and discussion, in the preparation of this article.
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representatives to engage in concerted activity on private property.
Normally, the unauthorized entry on property owned by another is a
trespass, a violation of state law which subjects the offender to damages and injunction and even to ejectment by the police. Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), however, gives employees the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, and to
engage in concerted activity. 2 It was held by the Supreme Court
some 35 years ago, in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,3 that in
certain circumstances Section 7 will entitle union representatives to
come onto private property.
In purporting to follow the Supreme Court's lead in Babcock &
Wilcox and later cases, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") adopted an analytical approach in its 1988 decision in
Jean Country4 which attempted to accommodate the Section 7 rights
of workers with the rights of private landowners in a variety of factual circumstances. A key element in most of the Board cases was
the fact that the property involved, although technically privately
owned, was within a shopping mall5 that was widely accessible to the
public for purposes of parking, visiting and shopping. The Board's
Jean Country approach was blessed by at least the First, Sixth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits.8
In reviewing the Lechmere case on certiorari to the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, the Supreme Court has now unequivocally repudiated the Jean Country line of cases - at least as applied
to organizing efforts by nonemployee union representatives - and
has sharply restricted the access of union organizers and other union
representatives who attempt to come onto private property normally
open to members of the public, in particular the familiar suburban
shopping mall. In doing so, the Court very strictly construed and
applied Babcock & Wilcox, and ignored the authority and responsibility traditionally accorded to federal agencies in interpreting the
governing statute and in applying it to particular factual
circumstances.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
3. 351 U.S. 105, 112-14 (1956).
4. 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
5. The terms "mall" and "shopping center" are used interchangeably throughout this
article, regardless of whether the stores are all joined and enclosed within a single roofed
structure.
6. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313, 320-21 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); Emery Realty, Inc. v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 1259, 1264 (6th Cir.
1988); Sentry Markets Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 113, 115-17 (7th Cir. 1990); Laborers' Local
204 v. NLRB (Hardee's), 904 F.2d 715, 717-19 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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The purpose of this article is to examine the legal background
of the issue of union access to private property, to recount the
Court's decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, and to critically evaluate that decision and its implications.
I.
To understand the Court's decision in Lechmere, it is necessary
to consider three earlier Supreme Court decisions that spoke to the
matter of union activity on private property.
In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,7 decided by the Court in
1956, full-time union organizers sought access to the company's privately owned employee parking lot, adjacent to its manufacturing
plant, to solicit for the union. The Supreme Court rejected the view
of the court of appeals that the law of trespass always trumps the
employee interest in having the union come onto company property,
and held instead that the Board was to work out an "accommodation" between the interest in private property and the employees'
statutory interest in knowing about the union." Key to this accommodation was the question whether the union could effectively communicate with company employees away from company property; only
if the union could not do so would the employer be required by the
Board to open its property so that the union could communicate its
message to the workers there. The Court found that the organizers
were able, on the particular record there, to contact employees on
the streets of the nearby small town (where many of the employees
lived) and through home visits and telephone calls. It therefore held
that there was no need for the employer to open its private property
to the organizers. 9
In cases decided over the next twenty years, the NLRB tended
to take a strict attitude in awarding the union access to private property, finding generally that the union could effectively communicate
without trespassing 0 - except in cases in which employees lived as
well as worked on company property.11
With the shift toward union organizing of service and retail establishments, as opposed to manufacturing establishments, and the
development of the shopping mall - technically private property but
7. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
8. Id. at 112-14.
9. Id. at 113-14.
10. See, e.g., Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 114, 117-18 (1982).
11. See, e.g., S & H Grossinger's Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 233 (1965), modified on other
grounds, 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
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infused with an open-ended invitation to the public to park, visit,
stroll, and shop - the issue of union access to so-called private property became more complex. With the Supreme Court decision in
1968 in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza Inc.,12 it looked as though labor activity in shopping
malls was to be treated as akin to free speech on public streets, such
that the federal constitution would displace state trespass laws, even
without reference to the NLRA. The Court retreated from this position in its 1976 decision in Hudgens v. NLRB,"3 but nonetheless announced in that case an approach that was broadly receptive to
union access under Section 7 of the Act.
Hudgens involved peaceful primary economic picketing (in the
midst of contract negotiations) by warehouse employees who went to
the company's retail shoe store in a large privately owned shopping
center. The Court invoked its 20-year old precedent in Babcock &
Wilcox, and reminded the NLRB that its task was to seek a proper
accommodation between the property rights of the mall owner and
the Section 7 rights of the shoe-company employees. 14 Significantly,
the Court acknowledged that in making that accommodation, the respective property and statutory interests could properly be calibrated
differently depending on different fact situations. The Court stated
that the point of accommodation "may fall at differing points along
the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respective
[Section] 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given
context," and that the decision was principally for the Board to
15
make.
On remand in Hudgens, the Board found an unfair labor practice.16 Although the economic picketing there was different from the
organizing effort in Babcock & Wilcox, it nonetheless was a weighty
Section 7 right; and because the union's intended audience was not
limited to store employees but also included customers, that entire
group could not effectively be reached by picketing at the nearest
public property at the distant edge of the shopping center.
One more Supreme Court case features in our prologue
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
-

12. 391 U.S. 308 (1968)(stating that peaceful picketing in a public place is protected by
the First Amendment).

13.

424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976)("The Constitution by no means requires such an attenu-

ated doctrine of dedication of private property to public use.").
14. Id. at 522.

15. Id.
16.

Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 416 (1977).
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Carpenters,17 decided in 1978. In that intricate case, the Court held
that state courts were not stripped of their jurisdiction to hear trespass cases involving union activity, despite the contention that this
would create an intolerable risk of state-court interference with activity protected under Section 7. The Court concluded that the risk
would not generally be significant.18 It noted that the union's burden
of showing inability to communicate away from company property
"is a heavy one," that the balance struck by the Board in implementing the Babcock & Wilcox "accommodation" approach "has rarely
been in favor of trespassory organizational activity,"' 9 and that access to private property "has generally been denied except in cases
involving unique obstacles to nontrespassory methods of
communication. 20
Ten years later, in 1988, after a substantial number of cases
attempting in the light of Hudgens to balance private-property rights
and concerted-activity rights, 21 the NLRB made a comprehensive
statement in Jean Country.2
There, as in Hudgens, the scene was a store owned by a tenant
within a shopping mall. The activity that the Jean Country store
owner challenged was picketing by union representatives (not employed by Jean Country) who carried signs, inside the mall at the
front of the store, to inform potential customers that the employees
at the store were not represented by the union. The mall owner and
the store owner had the police eject the pickets. In ruling that the
pickets were entitled to patrol there, and that it was an unfair labor
practice to exclude them, the Board set forth a detailed analytical
approach that it continued to apply in some 30 cases thereafter. 23 It
stated that in each case it would assess, and then give varying degrees of weight to, three factors:
the degree of impairment of the Section 7 right if access should be
denied, as it balances against the degree of impairment of the private property right if access should be granted. We view the consideration of the availability of reasonably effective alternative
means as especially significant in this balancing process. 24
17.

436 U.S. 180 (1978).

18. Id. at 198.
19. Id. at 205.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 205 n.41.
See, e.g. Fairmont Hotel, 282 N.L.R.B. 139 (1986).
291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
See, e.g., infra notes 31, 85, 86 and accompanying text.
Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14.
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The Board went on to state that, in weighing the property right,
it would consider among other things "the restrictions, if any, that
are imposed [by the owner] on public access to the property....
In weighing the Section 7 right, the Board would consider among
other things the nature of the right (e.g., was it an economic protest,
a protest against employer unfair labor practices, an organizing effort, or an "area standards" appeal?) and the identity of the intended audience. In assessing alternative means of reaching the
union's audience, the Board would among other things look to "the
safety of attempting communications at alternative public sites, the
burden and expense of nontrespassory communication alternatives,
and most significantly, the extent to which exclusive use of the nontrespassory alternatives would dilute the effectiveness of the message.
"26

The Board in Jean Country then proceeded to apply its newly
articulated analysis to the facts at hand. The Board found that the
mall owner and
tenant store had a private-property interest that was
"quite weak,"217 principally because the mall had 106 stores and serviced between 10,000 and 20,000 visitors every day, who freely
parked and wandered where they wished; and the picketing inside
the mall structure was done by no more than two persons at a time
in a non-obstructive manner akin to that of persons ordinarily walking and shopping at the mall. The Board found the picketing to be
organizational, designed to induce store customers not to patronize,
and held this to be within the protection of Section 7 - even though
such informational activity "has lesser significance in the scheme of
Section 7 than direct organizational solicitation or the protestation of
unfair labor practices. 28
Finally, the Board assessed whether the union could reasonably
bring its message to the intended audience - the Jean Country customers - by nontrespassory means. It found that a campaign
through television, radio, newspaper and mass mailings would not be
reasonable for the union to undertake; it would not address the customers as they approached the situs, and it would be extremely expensive to undertake such a campaign in the New York metropolitan
area.29 Nor would it be reasonable to relegate the picketing to the
nearest public property abutting the mall, an automobile entry point
25. Id. at 13.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 18 n.18.
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one-quarter of a mile from the Jean Country store; this would make
it impossible to target Jean Country customers (particularly "impulse" buyers) and would risk turning away customers from the mall
altogether or from stores other than Jean Country. The Board thus
concluded that the only way the union could effectively communicate
its message was to do so on mall property adjacent to the Jean
Country store.30
In its summary, the Board found no significant impairment of a
private property right - but that the Section 7 right would be significantly impaired (if not destroyed) without entry onto mall property. In the overwhelming proportion of its decisions subsequent to
Jean Country, the Board after utilizing the same tripartite analytical
framework, concluded that owners of mall property had a lightweight private-property interest and that alternative forms of communication to promote Section 7 rights were impracticable, and directed the respondent to admit the union onto the mall property. 31
II.
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB-2 was one of those cases. Lechmere
owned the principal store in an L-shaped suburban "strip" shopping
center in Connecticut. The parking lot for employees and customers,
between Lechmere and the other stores, was jointly owned by Lechmere and the mall owner. On one of its sides, the parking lot was
separated from the adjacent four-lane divided highway by a 46-footwide grassy strip of public property. Unlike in Jean Country, the
union representatives in Lechmere were not seeking to communicate
with customers but rather with Lechmere's employees, to induce
them to join the union. Union efforts to enter onto the parking lot to
insert handbills on the windshield of employee cars were met by demands by Lechmere personnel to leave the lot; the company had a
longstanding policy announcing a prohibition upon nonemployees
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Target Stores, 300 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1028 (Dec.

21, 1990)(lessee in shopping mall had weak property interest due to lack of notices restricting
access, and other methods were dangerous or would dilute the union's message); Wegmans
Food Markets, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1319 (Dec. 11, 1990)(supermarket in strip center had weak property interest in part because of public accessibility,
and picket signs would be inadequate and unsafe). But see Richway, 294 N.L.R.B. No. 49,
131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1362 (Aug. 29, 1989)(property right of two free-standing retail department stores, located on company-owned tracts of land with parking lots used solely by their
customers, found substantial enough to merit denying access).
32. U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), rev'g, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990), enforcing, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1480 (June 15, 1989).
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"soliciting and distributing literature at all times anywhere on Company property, including parking lots" ' 33 , and it consistently applied
that prohibition, even against the likes of the Salvation Army and
the Girl Scouts. The union handbillers relocated to the grassy strip,
where they picketed. Union representatives also got names and addresses (of some 40 employees out of 200) from state motor-vehicle
authorities by recording license plate numbers as presumed employee
cars entered and left the parking lot, and they sent some mailings to
those employees and also reached a few by telephone (half had unlisted numbers) and home visits.
The Board held, relying on Jean Country, that Lechmere's insistence on removing the union organizers from the mall parking lot
was an unfair labor practice. It emphasized the importance under
Section 7 of communicating with employees about the merits of the
union, and gave rather little weight to the private-property interest
in the parking lot, given its openness to customers and employees of
all stores in the mall and the unobtrusive conduct of the handbillers.
The Board also scrutinized the nontrespassory means of communicating with the Lechmere employees, and found them to be wanting:
newspaper advertisements were expensive and far from assured to
reach the workers, tracking license plates would leave many Lechmere employees unidentified, the bulk of the employees whose names
and addresses were obtained either had unlisted telephone numbers
or were minors whose parents forbade them to speak with the union,
and picketing on the grassy strip adjoining the busy highway created
safety problems. A divided court of appeals approved the Board's
tripartite analysis under Jean Country and the application of that
analysis to the facts of the case.
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion for six Justices written by Justice Clarence Thomas; three Justices dissented. The Court
majority held that the case was completely covered by its decision in
Babcock & Wilcox, whose force the Court stated had not been diluted or its rationale modified in later Court cases such as
Hudgens.34 Babcock & Wilcox was said to turn on the question
whether the persons seeking access to private property were company
employees or rather were nonemployee union organizers; if the latter, persons without Section 7 rights themselves, then their access
rights are totally derivative from those of the company workers.
Whether access is to be afforded thus turns exclusively on whether
33.
34.

-

Id. at

U.S. _,
112 S. Ct. at 844 n.1.
-,
112 S. Ct. at 845-47.
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"the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees
place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to
communicate with them."3 5 The Court stated that this would be so
only in the rarest of cases, where there are "unique obstacles"3 6 to
communicating away from company property, and that the "union's
burden of establishing such [employee] isolation is . . . 'a heavy
one.' M7 Justice Thomas noted, as "classic examples," earlier decisions of the Board and the appeals courts involving the logging
camp,3 8 the mining camp, 39 and the mountain resort hotel,40 where
employees live as well as work on company property and thus are
"presumptively" beyond the reach of the union's message.
The Court flatly repudiated the Board's effort at "accommodating" interests of nonemployee organizers and private-property owners ircases in which there are alternative means of communicating
with the workers.4 1 In effect, the Court held that it was altogether
irrelevant, in the application of Section 7 to organizing efforts by
nonemployees, whether the company property is a manufacturing
plant far from a public highway and accessed only by company employees and from which members of the public are barred, or is a
retail establishment in a mall whose stores and parking facilities are
frequented throughout the day by shoppers and by members of the
public seeking recreation.
In a rather striking conclusion to its opinion, the Court majority
chose not to remand the case to the NLRB for an assessment of the
issue of reasonable nontrespassory access under the single-factor
Babcock & Wilcox analysis rather than the three-factor "accommodation" analysis of Jean Country. Instead, the Court took it upon
itself to review the record evidence, and to conclude - contrary to
the Board - that the union had adequate access to the Lechmere
employees away from the mall property, given the substantial number of names and addresses uncovered by tracking license plates,
35. Id. at _,
105, 113 (1956)).

112 S. Ct. at 849 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.

36. Id. at .,

112 S. Ct. at 850 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County

Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205-06 n.41 (1978)).

37. Id. at

112 S. Ct. at 849 (quoting Sears, Roebuck, 436 U.S. at 205).

,

38. Id. at -,
112 S. Ct. at 849 (citing NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167
F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948)).

39. Id. at
(1972)).
40. Id. at-

,

112 S. Ct. at 849 (citing Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023
112 S.Ct. at 849 (citing NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d

26 (2d Cir. 1967)).
41. Id. at -. , 112 S. Ct. at 849.
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along with the mailings, telephone calls and home visits. 42 Because
of the "presumption" of access flowing from the fact that the Lechmere workers did not live on company property, and the "heavy burden" the union or General Counsel bears to overcome that presumption, the Court held that Lechmere had no obligation to afford
access to the union organizers, reversed the court of appeals, and
denied enforcement of the Board's order.43
Justice White dissented for himself and Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Stevens separately dissented for similar reasons. The principal points made by Justice White - and they are, to this reader,
fully persuasive - are that Babcock & Wilcox in fact invited the
Board to make an "accommodation" of the respective Section 7 and
property interests of the parties, that this approach was yet more
clearly endorsed by the Court years later in Hudgens, that the Board
can properly consider in making that accommodation factors other
than merely nontrespassory access to the workers, that access to
company property may be appropriate under Section 7 even though
workers do not live there, that the Court had failed (under standards
announced in post-Babcock & Wilcox cases concerning the respective role of court and agency in matters of statutory construction) to
give proper deference to the Board's reasonably based interpretation
of Section 7, and that the Court also exceeded its power by reviewing the factual record itself to determine whether the union could
convey its message through reasonable means away from company
property."
III.
The Lechmere case, as the Court suggests, is very much a replay of the Babcock & Wilcox case some 35 years before: Are nonemployee union organizers entitled to enter upon privately owned
property in order to communicate (by speech or written literature)
with company employees about the union? Nonetheless, the Court's
mechanical approach to the application of the Babcock & Wilcox
decision is untenable. It disregards open-ended language in Babcock
& Wilcox and clarifying developments in later Court cases, especially ffudgens. It ignores what should be treated as a very important difference in the nature of the employer's property in Babcock
& Wilcox and in Lechmere. It trivializes the core Section 7 right of
42.

Id. at

,

112 S. Ct. at 849.

43. Id. at

,

112 S. Ct. at 849-50.

44. Id. at

-,

112 S. Ct. at 850-53 (White, J., dissenting).
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workers to learn about the merits of a union. And it cavalierly ignores the strictures on judicial review of agency decisionmaking in
statutory interpretation and application.
The right of employees to be informed about a union must be
regarded as the central right to be protected by Section 7, for it is a
necessary predicate to the rights explicitly given there to "form, join,
or assist" 45 a labor organization and thereafter to deal through that
organization in collective bargaining - and also the Section 7 right
to refrain from supporting the union.46 Babcock & Wilcox was arguably wrong in holding that union organizers, who are not employed by the company being organized, have no Section 7 rights
themselves because they are not "employees" within that Section given the total open-endedness of the statutory definition of "employee" in Section 2(3) the NLRA;47 the fact that the key labor
legislation coincident with the 1935 Wagner Act (the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the history of judicial events leading to it) leaves
no doubt of Congress's intention altogether to abandon artificial limits on the definition, such as any requirement of a "proximate" employer-employee relationship; 48 and the fact that union organizers
are employees of the union.
Assuming, however, that it is too late to challenge that point in
Babcock & Wilcox, and that "nonemployee" organizers derive rights
of access only to the extent necessary to advance "employee" Section
7 rights, the right to learn about the union should be staunchly supported, no less surely than property rights (which are nowhere mentioned in the NLRA).
The Court said as much in Babcock & Wilcox:
Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority,
the National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other....
[W]hen the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them
through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has
been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communica45. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
46. Id.
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly

states otherwise ...." Id.
48. See e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees,
481 U.S. 429 (1987).
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tion of information on the right to organize. 49

Although holding that this was indeed a tougher standard to satisfy
than in the cases of solicitation by company employees who are already on company property during the workday, the Babcock & Wilcox Court did not at all state that the standard was well-nigh impossible to satisfy, as the Court now portrays it in Lechmere.
The Babcock & Wilcox test just quoted is full of open-ended
language: inaccessibility, ineffective, reasonable attempts, communicate, usual channels. The Babcock & Wilcox Court in effect provided two interpretive boundary lines in applying this standard: in
the remote lumber camp, organizers must normally be allowed onto
company property, but on the facts of Babcock & Wilcox itself,
where "the plants are close to small well-settled communities where
a large percentage of the employees live," 50 organizers need not be
allowed onto company property. But, as Justice White stated in dissent, there is nothing in Babcock & Wilcox that compels the conclusion that the remote logging camp is the only kind of situation that
51
warrants an access order from the Board.
It is indisputably the business of the Board, at least initially and
presumably subject to very limited judicial review, to apply the openended language from Babcock & Wilcox. In the past 35 years, population centers have become more concentrated at the core and more
sprawling on the periphery, unionization has moved increasingly
from the manufacturing sector into retail and service establishments
dealing directly with the public, privately owned property has been
widely opened to the community for commercial purposes, and methods of communication have become more diversified. One would
think that the NLRB - particularly in light of its recurrent expo49. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
50. Id. at 113.
51. See Lechmere,_ U.S. at 112 S. Ct. at 851 (White, J., dissenting). The

Court majority strongly relied on the passages in Sears, Roebuck, 436 U.S. 180, 204-05
(1978), that pointed out how rare and unique were the occasions on which the Board found
nontrespassory organizational activity to be inadequate. See Lechmere, U.S. at -,
112
S. Ct. at 846-50. Yet Justice White, at footnote I of his dissenting opinion, convincingly chal-

lenged the weight placed by the Court upon Sears, Roebuck and its downplaying of the "accommodation" analysis endorsed in Hudgens. See Lechmere, U.S. at -,
112 S. Ct. at
851-52 (White, J., dissenting). Most pertinently, the Court's concern in Sears, Roebuck was

the trespass jurisdiction of state courts which "only peripherally involved substantive principles
of § 7 accommodation by the NLRB," which was the central issue in Hudgens. Moreover, the
summary in Sears, Roebuck of what was the Board's rather tight-fisted jurisprudence in access
cases should be treated, as Justice White says, as "a descriptive recounting" of the Board law

at that time "and not any prescription from this Court as to the analysis the Board should
apply." Lechmere,

-

U.S. at

-, 112 S. Ct. at 851-52 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
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sure to those developments in the cases that come before it - would
be in a peculiarly effective position to apply the broad mandates of
the statute to the circumstances that surround union communication
in a changing society.
When applying that language, the Board may properly be mindful of the "accommodation" language of Babcock & Wilcox, which
invites an assessment of the gravity of the Section 7 right - here,
the cardinal right of access to information about the union - and
the gravity of the employer's property right. This kind of assessment
and accommodation are even more explicitly invited by the Court in
Hudgens which, after quoting the "accommodation" language from
Babcock & Wilcox, went on to say that:
The locus of that accommodation ... may fall at differing points
along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the

respective [Section] 7 rights and private property rights asserted in
any given context. In each generic situation, the primary responsibility for making 52this accommodation must rest with the Board in
the first instance.
Thus, it seems quite consistent with the Court's precedents for the
Board to allocate varying weights to different Section 7 rights and to
different kinds of private property.
The Supreme Court in Lechmere altogether ignores the fact
that the only factual setting presented to the Court in Babcock &
Wilcox was the manufacturing plant and adjacent employee parking
lot. This kind of isolated private tract to which the public had no
access could properly have been thought by the Court to weigh very
heavily in its "accommodation" analysis, thus imposing an obligation
upon the union organizers to go to fairly arduous lengths to communicate with workers at their homes and places of recreation in the
nearby towns. It does not at all follow that the Babcock & Wilcox
analysis compels precisely the same disposition when the private
property interest to be "accommodated" is manifested in a freely
accessible shopping mall parking lot to which the public is invited
and which in fact serves as a place of recreation as well as a place to
shop (and for many young persons, it seems, a home away from
home).
Even if the condition for access to private property for union
organizers is a finding that there are no reasonable means to communicate with workers away from that property, the Board should not
be denied the power to find that, say, reaching 40 percent of the
52.

Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 522.
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workers away from company property might be "adequate" to warrant keeping them off securely guarded plant property, but might not
be "adequate" when the countervailing employer property interest is
the sort found in the standard suburban mall. Nor should the Board
be denied the power to find that, for example, reaching 20 percent of
the employees away from company property 53 is "adequate" when
the union is seeking to enlist the support of workers or of consumers
in aid of a work stoppage at another business at a distant location,
but might not be "adequate" when the union is seeking to inform the
workers about the union's advantages and to enclose a membership
application.54
By making the test of "alternative means of communication"
turn exclusively upon the finding of some percentage of workers who
might be reached away from company property, regardless of the
"openness" or "closedness" of that property (and apparently regardless of the nature of the union's message and the "strength" of the
Section 7 right), the Lechmere Court failed adequately to heed the
"accommodation" standard announced in Babcock & Wilcox and
elaborated in Hudgens.
IV.
The flaw in the Court's Lechmere opinion runs yet deeper. The
Court conceded that, under the so-called Chevron doctrine, named
for the Court's 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,55 in the absence of Congress having
"directly addressed the precise question at issue," i.e., if the statute
is "silent or ambiguous," courts should defer to an agency's statutory
interpretation if it is "permissible" or "reasonable." 5 The Chevron
decision states that "[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
the administrator of an agency, ' 57 and that "The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly
could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading
53. See, e.g., Lechmere, U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 845 (the union had secured the
names and addresses of 20% of Lechmere's employees, and sent them three mailings).
54. See Laborers' Local 204 v. NLRB (Hardee's), 904 F.2d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("The principle that non-core rights merit less weight in the balance, the Board recognized,
should inform the analysis of whether a union has reasonable alternative means to reach the
targets of its section 7 activity").
55. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See also NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S.
775 (1990).
56. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
57. Id. at 844.
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the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding." ' The Chevron Court gave as a particularly
pointed case for judicial deference one in which the agency has made
"a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute."5'
One can quibble with Chevron as mandating an undue level of
judicial deference to the agency, as stripping the courts of their responsibility to draw upon the usual sources of statutory analysis to
make a definitive interpretation of congressional will, and as inviting
or at least condoning undue equivocation and inconstancy by the
agency over time. Be that as it may, the Chevron doctrine is by now
well established; and it not only gives the agency discretion to choose
among reasonable statutory interpretations but also to change the
interpretation over time. In Lechmere, Justice Thomas stated that
the deferential Chevron standard did not obtain, because the language of Section 7 was sufficiently clear to compel the conclusion
that rights are accorded under that Section only to a company's employees, that nonunion organizers are to be accorded a right to come
onto private property only as a derivative of employee rights, and
therefore if employees can learn of the union's message through nontrespassory communications the nonemployee organizers need not be
permitted on company property.60
For the Lechmere Court to assert, however, that the language of
Section 7, by according rights only to "employees," satisfies the
Chevron requirement - that Congress directly address the precise
question at issue - is little short of mind-boggling. Even apart from
the ambiguity in the meaning of the word "employees" in Section 7,
that Section says not a word remotely bearing upon the issue of employer private-property rights, nor does any other provision in the
NLRA. The Court in Babcock & Wilcox concluded that such property rights were to be taken into account in applying the statute because "[o]rganization rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property rights."'"
It also derived, without the slightest statutory directive, a requirement that these two competing rights were to be accommodated
"with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other"' 2 - precisely the kind of "accommodation of
58.

Id. at 843 n.ll.

59. Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
60.
61.
62.

Lechmere, U.S. at -. , 112 S. Ct. at 847-48.
Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
Id.
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conflicting policies" noted by the Chevron Court as the prime context for judicial deference to agency interpretation.
The open-ended texture of the statute on this issue was emphasized even further by the Court in its Hudgens decision, which explicitly states that in making the required accommodation the Board
may give varying degrees of weight to the property interest in different cases depending upon its nature and strength. The Court there,
in a case involving a 60-store suburban shopping mall with a parking
lot with room enough for 2,640 automobiles at once, obviously
viewed the private-property claim as less substantial than that in a
case like Babcock & Wilcox, involving a stand-alone secluded manufacturing facility and employee parking lot.
Given the absence of any statutory reference to employer private-property interests, let alone any statutory clues as to how to
"accommodate" those interests against employee rights to form and
join unions, it is simply untenable for the Lechmere majority to conclude that it is impermissible and unreasonable for the NLRB to
take into account in making the required accommodation the nature
and weight of the employer's property interest. Even if the Babcock
& Wilcox decision were to be read as construing the NLRA to require a single-factor analysis turning exclusively upon reasonably
available nontrespassory communications, without any attention to
the nature and weight of the employer's property interest, that would
be a reading of the statute that is consistent with its terms. But it
does not follow that a single-factor interpretation is the only permissible or reasonable one, or that Babcock & Wilcox would have so
held had it been prescient enough to advert to the Chevron standard
of judicial review.
If that is true, then as Justice White argued in dissent, Chevron
would clearly require that the Board's tripartite accommodation
analysis of Jean Country should be sustained - without eliminating
the possibility that a future Board might change its mind and embrace instead the narrower, single-factor approach dictated by the
Court majority in Lechmere 4 It appears, given its failure to defer to
the Board in Lechmere, that the Court's attachment to the Chevron
doctrine - a congenial doctrine for a Court committed to "judicial
restraint" - waxes and wanes, depending less upon the Court's
identification of statutory ambiguity than upon its approval or its
dislike of the principle endorsed by the agency in the case under
63.
64.

Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 522.
Lechmere, U.S. -,
112 S. Ct. at 852-53 (White, J., dissenting).
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review.
V.
That Lechmere manifests a regrettable disregard of the Board's
proper role is highlighted all the more by the Court's failure to remand the case to the Board, to give the Board an opportunity to
reassess its conclusion regarding inadequate nontrespassory means in
light of the rejection of the Board's balancing approach and the substitution of the Court's single-factor analysis. Instead, the Court
looked at the record evidence and drew its own independent conclusion as to whether the union had been reasonably able to communicate with Lechmere's employees away from company property. To
say the least, the Court rode roughshod over the Board's factual
inferences.
Babcock & Wilcox requires a determination of "when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by
nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels."'6 5 Determining whether employees are "inaccessible," what
channels of communication are "usual," what union attempts are
"reasonable" and, the central issue, whether in light of all of these,
the union's efforts are "ineffective," requires the finding of evidentiary facts and the drawing of conclusionary inferences. Application
of the Babcock & Wilcox standard entails an assessment of at least
three factual elements: the number or percentage of employees who
are (or could be) reached, the communicational media that are (or
could be) used, and the nature of the message to be communicated.
These are matters as to which the Board's findings and inferences
are entitled to the greatest deference; a court must treat them as
conclusive if they are "supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole," as provided in Section 10(f) of the
NLRA. 66
In Lechmere, the Board concluded "that there was no reasonable, effective alternative means available for the Union to communicate its message to the Respondent's employees."'6 7 No reader of the
Board's decision can fairly regard its factual findings and inferences,
and its ultimate conclusion, as perfunctory; they are fully developed
and substantiated. The Supreme Court should not have set them
aside. The Court's superficial assessment of the factual record makes
65. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1988).
67. Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1480, 1482 (June 15,
112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
U.S. -,
1989), enforced, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, -
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it all the plainer why such a task should be undertaken by the Board,
subject to a heavy presumption of expertise, regularity and judicial

approval.6 8
The Board considered all of the same means of communication
as did the Court - placing an advertisement in the local newspapers, tracking down employee names and addresses from license
plates and state motor-vehicle authorities, mailings to some 20 percent of the Lechmere workforce, telephone calls and home visits, and
picketing on the grassy strip alongside a heavily trafficked highway.
The Board noted that the union had placed notices in local
newspapers, but concluded that "this method of communication is
' It was thought ineffective because
both expensive and ineffective." 69
the Board could not find "evidence of receipt of a discrete message
intended for a specific audience," because "many" of the Lechmere
employees may never have received, purchased or read the papers in
question.70 The Supreme Court, rather than making its own findings
of fact, should have considered whether the Board erred in announcing these two standards: that there must be receipt of a discrete mes-

sage intended for a specific audience, and that a communication
should not fail to reach "many" of the Lechmere workers. Those
standards are altogether unexceptionable,7 1 as is the Board's factual
finding that they were not satisfied in the case.
68. It is true that the Supreme Court in Babcock & Wilcox did precisely the same thing
reverse a Board finding of inadequate nontrespassory access without remand for a fresh
Board conclusion in light of the correct legal standard just announced by the Court. See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105. As indefensible as such an outright reversal was in Babcock &
Wilcox, it is surely more untenable in Lechmere, in light of the intervening Chevron decision
which commands deference not merely on factual inferences but also on matters of statutory
construction, and also in light of the fact that the Board has since Babcock & Wilcox developed some 35 years of accumulated experience in addressing the issue of nontrespassory communication by union organizers.
69. Lechmere, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 131 L.R.R.M. at 1482, enforced, 914 F.2d 313
(1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, - U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
70. Id. The NLRB does not treat newspaper and radio campaigns as inevitably ineffective. See Red Food Stores, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1164 (Aug. 31,
1989)(Board found media campaign to be effective alternative means).
71. Compare Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240-41 (1966), in which
the NLRB supported its requirement that employee names and addresses must be turned over
to the Regional Director, who would then make them available to the union, in a representation election with the observation that the union otherwise "has no method by which it can be
certain of reaching all the employees with its arguments in favor of representation." (emphasis
added). See also NLRB v. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), in which the
Court held that the NLRB acted reasonably and within its power when it interpreted Section
8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988), to be violated when an employee discharge was motivated in any degree by anti-union animus, rather than requiring that such animus be the dominant motive.
-
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The Board also concluded that ascertaining names and addresses by tracking automobile license plates, even through diligent
efforts, was "flawed," in view of the fact that some employees may
have been driven to work by others, or used automobiles registered
to others, or parked elsewhere in the Lechmere lot, or traveled to
work by means other than automobiles. Thus, the effectiveness of the
license-tracking technique "as a comprehensive source" of employee
names and addresses is "patently minimal," said the Board. 2 Again,
the requirement that access to names and addresses must be "comprehensive," and the fact-based conclusion that such a requirement
was not satisfied in Lechmere, are unexceptionable, and should have
been upheld by the Court as having fallen well within the authority
of the Board.
The same is true of the Board's determination that union attempts to communicate on a strip of public property (whether grassy
or concrete) between a mall parking lot and a highway should not be
treated as adequate if such attempts would create significant
problems of traffic congestion or would jeopardize the union representatives' personal safety, as the factual record showed in
73
Lechmere.
The Supreme Court's discussion of inaccessibility of employees
is worrisome for other reasons. The Court appears to warn that it
will not sustain a finding of inaccessibility based solely on the fact
that employees live in a large metropolitan area, or solely on the fact
that "direct contact" with employees cannot be made.74 Indeed, on
the latter point, the Court came close to repudiating the Board's
finding that newspaper advertisements are not to be regarded as effective when they are unduly expensive and are unlikely to come to
the attention of most of the employees. Yet the Board should be permitted to give great weight to these facts in making a determination
of accessibility, and for the Court to suggest otherwise ignores decades of its own pronouncements about the Board's special expertise
in matters relating to worker communications in the industrial
setting.
More worrisome yet is the Court's conclusion that, quite apart
72. Lechmere, 295 N.L.R.B.
(IstCir. 1990), rev'd, _
U.S. 73. See, e.g., Sentry Markets,
ing Board's finding of no reasonable
testimony that "the high volume of

No. 15, 131 L.R.R.M. at 1482, enforced, 914 F.2d 313
, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 113, 117 (7th Cir. 1990)(upholdalternative means where such finding was based in part on
traffic may make distribution of handbills on public prop-

erty unsafe").
74.

Lechmere,

-

U.S.

-,

112 S. Ct. at 849-50.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

19

Hofstra Hofstra
Labor and
Employment Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss.[Vol.
1 [1991],
Art. 1
9:1
Labor Law Journal

from newspaper advertisements, home visits and the like, "other alternative means of communication were readily available, 7' 5 referring in particular to "signs (displayed, for example, from the public
grassy strip adjoining Lechmere's parking lot) [that] would have informed the employees about the union's organizational efforts ...
Access to employees, not success in winning them over, is the critical
issue . ,,76 The Court grievously trivializes the Section 7 right of
employees to learn about the union when it treats that right as satisfied by the communication of a short phrase or two on a typical
picket sign, displayed to employees entering their workplace at a dis77
tance from the pickets.
The Court in Babcock & Wilcox referred to safeguarding the
Section 7 right of employees by protecting, if need be by access to
private property, the union's ability "to distribute union literature,"
"to reach the employees with its message," and to "communicat[e]
information on the right to organize. ' 78 Surely that statutory objective is not satisfied simply because union representatives can hold up
a picket sign. More pertinently, surely it is reasonable for the Board
in applying the Babcock & Wilcox phrases to the facts of particular cases - so to conclude, and that was the only question properly
before the Court in Lechmere. Justice White is correct when he
states in dissent: "If employees are entitled to learn from others the
advantages of self-organization, it is singularly unpersuasive to suggest that the union has sufficient access for this purpose by being
able to hold up signs from a public
grassy strip adjacent to the high'79
way leading to the parking lot."
The Court poses a false dichotomy when it states: "Access to
employees, not success in winning them over, is the critical issue." 80
There is a mid-point between simply alerting employees that a union
wants them to join and successfully convincing them to join; that
point is the opportunity to communicate reasons to join. The Board
did not conclude, as the Court suggests, that the union could come
onto the Lechmere parking lot simply because it had been unsuccessful in winning them over through other means.81 Rather, the Board
75.

Id. at

,

112 S. Ct. at 849.

76. Id. at -,
112 S. Ct. at 849-50.
77. See Sentry Markets, 914 F.2d at 117 ("picket signs could not contain all the information that the Union wished to disseminate").
78.

Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 111-13.

79.

Lechmere, -

U.S. at -

,

112 S. Ct. at 851 (White, J.,
dissenting)(citations

omitted).
80. Id. at -,
112 S. Ct. at 850 (emphasis deleted).
81. See Lechmere, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 131 L.R.R.M at 1482, enforced, 914 F.2d 313
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concluded that the union had no reasonable opportunity away from
company property to communicate a message with some substantive
content. That understanding of "access" is clearly consistent with
the statute and with Babcock & Wilcox.
The Court chided the Board for basing its factual conclusion of
non-access on "mere conjecture or the expression of doubts concerning the effectiveness of nontrespassory means of communication. 82
If, however, the Board's doubts are substantial and properly based
on the record, and if what the Court calls conjecture is in fact the
Board's derivative inferences about union-employee communications
in a factual setting familiar to it as an expert agency, then the
Court's admonitions are altogether misplaced. 8
VI.
In conclusion, three limitations on the decision in Lechmere
warrant mention.
First, it must be emphasized that the Court did not in any respect purport to diminish the Section 7 rights of employees to engage in organizing activity on company property, at least during the
time period when those employees are there in connection with their
work. Moreover, even if an employee working at a mall decides to do
an hour of shopping at other mall stores at the end of the workday,
and then returns to his or her automobile in the employee section of
the parking lot, it would be highly artificial to treat that employee as
beyond the shelter of Section 7 when placing, for example, a handbill under the windshield wiper of an automobile known to belong to
a fellow employee.
Second, even in those cases in which the persons seeking to engage in organizing activities on property owned by the employer are
not its own employees, Babcock & Wilcox contemplates that an employer order forbidding access will be invalidated if that order "discriminate[s] against the union by allowing other distribution." 4
Nothing in Lechmere - which focuses only on the "no alternative
communication" basis for striking down a no-access rule
can reasonably be understood as undermining the "discrimination" basis for
so doing. Thus, if an owner of a mall property allows there a number
of solicitations, meetings, celebrations and other uses by third persons - unlike Lechmere, which excluded the likes of the Girl Scouts
-

(1st Cir.
82.
83.
84.

1990), rev'd, U.S.
112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
Lechmere, U.S. at -,
112 S. Ct. at 849.
See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
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and the Salvation Army - then singling out the union for exclusion
is unlawful. The Board in several cases decided after Jean Country
had pointed to such permitted gatherings as diluting the employer's
private-property interest85 But even after the Supreme Court decision in Lechmere, any such disparate application of the employer's
no-solicitation rule should be given yet greater weight through a
standard application of Babcock & Wilcox, so as automatically to
trigger an unfair labor practice finding.
Third, the Court in Lechmere did not speak at all to the fact
situation in the bulk of the cases decided by the Board after 1988
under the Jean Country analysis - union appeals to customers of
the offending employer, typically a retail establishment in a mall setting.86 In some cases, the handbilling or picketing of customers was
done by persons employed by the targeted company, protesting either the company's unfair labor practices or its involvement in
stalled labor negotiations. This was indeed the fact situation in
Hudgens, in which a shoe store in a mall was picketed by employees
from the company's warehouse, seeking to inform customers of a
strike resulting from a breakdown in collective negotiations.
In other cases presented to the Board after its decision in Jean
Country, the handbilling or picketing of customers was done by persons employed at some other company, typically either a unionized
competitor of the targeted company (protesting its failure to meet
the union's "area standards") or a unionized company with which
the targeted company was doing business. In Jean Country itself, for
example, the picketing was "conducted at least in part on behalf of
the unionized employees of those stores that were in competition
with the nonunion Jean Country store, '87 and their picket signs announced: "To the Public. Jean Country is non-union. The maintenance of a non-union store is a threat to wages, hours and conditions
established by the union."88
The cases just described are to be distinguished from Lechmere
85. See, e.g., Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 136 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1319 (Dec. 11, 1989)(finding lack of a no-solicitation policy and the allowance of
certain political campaigning on property to weaken store owner's property interest); Trident
Seafoods Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1247 (May 12, 1989)(finding
employer's property interest in remote salmon cannery weakened by allowance of visitors onto

property in violation of company policy requiring registration).
86. See, e.g., Target Stores, 300 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1028 (Dec.
21, 1990)(area-standards handbilling of stores located in shopping malls); Red Food Stores,
Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1164 (Aug. 31, 1989)(area-standards picketing of stores located in strip shopping centers).
87. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 17.

88. Id. at 15.
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in two crucial respects. First, the persons seeking access to private
property to communicate the union's message are - unlike the
Lechmere nonemployee organizers - "employees" (of the targeted
company, a competitor or a company contractually related) within
the shelter of Section 7 of the NLRA or are the designated majority
representative of those employees (who are properly to be treated as
acting in their stead and thus entitled to Section 7 rights as well).
Thus, the right of these persons to communicate is based directly
upon the NLRA, and is not merely derivative from the right of
others. Second, the handbillers or pickets are directing their message
to the customers of a retail establishment, rather than its employees.
Because this audience is much more diffuse, and difficult if not impossible to identify as they make their way between mall property
and adjacent public walkways and roadways, the need to address
them on the mall property closer to the targeted store can reasonably
be found more compelling than in the case of a discrete and often
more identifiable employee audience.
Lechmere thus represents a fairly small piece - nonemployee
organizers seeking to address the members of a discrete workforce
- of a larger picture of union communication on property open to
the public. In the bulk of the cases recently presented to the Board,
there are Section 7 rights to be taken into account, along with the
nature and accessibility of the intended audience, and the property
interest of the store and/or mall owner. In those cases, the tripartite
analysis invited by Hudgens and fully formulated in Jean Country
should still obtain.
POSTSCRIPT

One might note, in conclusion, that the suggestion just made
regarding the continued vitality of Jean Country is supported by the
1990 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Laborers' Local 204 v. NLRB (Hardee's).89
There, a union representing employees at a construction company
remodeling a Hardee's restaurant distributed handbills at the privately owned parking lots at a number of other Hardee locations,
urging Hardee customers to withdraw their patronage because of the
construction company's failure to pay area-standard wages.
The Board employed its Jean Country analysis, and found
among other things that Hardee's property right was not compelling,
in light of the unobtrusive distribution of handbills and the fact that
89.

904 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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its parking lots were generally treated as public property. However,
the Board ruled against union access, because the weight of the
union's statutory right to protest substandard wages being paid by a
different company at a distant location was found to be weak. 90
The court of appeals sustained the Board and denied the union's
petition for review. In its opinion, written by Judge Ruth Ginsburg,
the unanimous panel invoked the "accommodation" analysis articulated in Hudgens, acknowledged the deference due the Board in accommodating Section 7 rights and private-property rights, and held
that, "The elaboration thus advanced in Jean Country, we are satisfied, sensibly construes the Act in light of High Court precedent in
point."9O1
Joining in the court's opinion was then Circuit Judge Clarence
Thomas.

90. See Hardee's Food System, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1345
(May 31, 1989), enforced sub nom. Laborers' Local 204 v. NLRB (Hardee's), 904 F.2d 715
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
91. Laborer's Local 204, 904 F.2d at 718.
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